PROSECUTING PRESIDENT AL BASHIR, AND THE SHORT ARM OF JUSTICE by Bullock, Suzanne
 197 
Denning Law Journal 2013 Vol 25 pp 197 - 209 
 
CASE COMMENTARY 
 
PROSECUTING PRESIDENT AL BASHIR, AND 
THE SHORT ARM OF JUSTICE 
 
Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir1 
 
Suzanne Bullock  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this decision the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) condemned Malawi, as a member state of the ICC, for the failure to 
comply with the request to arrest and surrender the President of Sudan, Omar 
Al Bashir. Significantly, the Chamber determined that the traditionally 
sacrosanct concept of immunity of Heads of State no longer applied before an 
international court or tribunal. Whilst the intention to create universal 
jurisdiction over perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity is 
extremely laudable, the legal reasoning by the Chamber is regrettably 
unsound. If the decision remains unchallenged, the implication is that no Head 
of State, whether or not they are a signatory to the ICC, is immune from 
prosecution on the mere basis of the ICC‟s status as an international court. 
As international law currently stands, jurisdiction over non-member states 
has to be derived from a higher authority. In the case of Sudan, such authority 
and resulting jurisdiction does indeed exist by virtue of United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1593, which refers the situation in 
Darfur to the ICC. This resolution implies powers to arrest and prosecute 
President Al Bashir, and had the Chamber relied on this authorisation to 
confirm its jurisdiction, no criticism could be raised. The need for such a 
Resolution (especially where non-member states are concerned) highlights the 
problem of the ICC‟s dependence on the UNSC. The paralysing effect of this 
dependence can be seen most clearly and recently in the case of Syria, where 
despite repeated calls by the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, no such 
referral to the ICC has taken place due to the exercise of veto powers in the 
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Security Council. It would therefore appear that despite the Pre-Trial 
Chamber‟s reasoning in the Bashir case, the ICC has a long way to go before 
its universal jurisdiction can be considered established. 
 
2. THE FACTS 
 
On March 31 2005 the UNSC passed Resolution 1593 which referred the 
situation in Darfur to the ICC and “urge[d] all States and concerned regional 
and other international organizations to cooperate fully” with the court. On 
March 4 2009 the Pre-Trial Chamber published its Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir (hereafter the March 4 2009 Decision) in which it asserted 
the ICC‟s jurisdiction over Omar Al Bashir despite his position as the current 
head of a state not party to the Rome Statute. This conclusion was based on 
the fact that one of the central aims of the Rome Statute is to end impunity for 
the perpetrators of the most serious international crimes. Furthermore, the Pre-
Trial Chamber stated that Article 27(1) and (2) provides that the Rome Statute 
applies to all people equally regardless of their position, and capacity as a 
Head of State did not exempt a person from criminal responsibility.
2
 The Pre-
Trial Chamber stated that customary international law rules establishing the 
immunity of serving heads of state did not bar the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction. The Chamber determined that because the Security Council had 
referred the matter to the ICC, it had also intended that any prosecution would 
take place within the framework of the Rome Statute. 
On March 4 2009 and July 12 2010, the Chamber issued an arrest warrant 
against Omar Al-Bashir.
3
 All State Parties were then sent a request for 
cooperation in accordance with Articles 89(1) and 91 of the Rome Statute “for 
the arrest and surrender” of President Al Bashir.4 Despite this request, 
together with a verbal reminder,
5
 the Republic of Malawi received President 
Al Bashir on a state visit as a guest and participant of a summit of regional 
leaders in Lilongwe in October 2011. Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
ordered the Registrar to transmit a copy of their report on the visit (and non-
cooperation with the request for arrest) to the Republic of Malawi, and to ask 
for the Republic‟s observations. 
                                                     
2
 Articles 27(1) and (2) and 98(1) and (2) of the Rome Statute 1998 are essential to 
the discussion at hand, and are therefore reproduced in full at the end of this Case 
Commentary. 
3 
ICC-02/05-01/09-1; ICC-02/05-01/09-95. 
4
 ICC-02/05-01/09-7. 
5
 ICC-02/05-01/09-136-Conf, Anx 4. The verbal reminder was sent to Malawi‟s 
Embassy in Brussels on the day before the presidential visit. 
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In its response,
6
 the Malawian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that 
President Al Bashir was a serving Head of State, and therefore Malawi should 
“accord ... him all the immunities and privileges guaranteed to every visiting 
Head of State and Government” including freedom from arrest and 
prosecution whilst on their territory. Since Sudan was not a party to the Rome 
Statute, Article 27 (waiving the immunity of heads of state) was not 
applicable. Moreover, Malawi accepted the position of the African Union on 
the matter, which upheld the immunity of serving heads of states not parties to 
the Rome Statute, challenged the warrant of arrest by the International 
Criminal Court for that reason, and asked its members for non-cooperation 
with the Court. On December 12 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber handed down 
its decision on the issue of Malawi‟s non-cooperation. 
 
3. THE DECISION 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber stated that Article 119(1) of the Rome Statute 
established the ultimate authority of the ICC to decide if immunities should be 
applied and respected in an individual situation. More significantly, it found 
that Malawi had ignored rule 195(1), according to which a member State 
aware of the existence of a problem with regard to a request for surrender or 
arrest should “provide any information relevant to assist the Court in the 
application of Article 98”. 
The Chamber rejected Malawi‟s first argument that President Al Bashir 
was immune from prosecution because he was a serving Head of State and 
Sudan was a non-signatory to the Rome Statute. They then considered the 
African Union position,
7
 which formed the basis of Malawi‟s second 
argument that Article 98(1) justified refusing to comply with the Cooperation 
                                                     
6
 Transmission of the observations from the Republic of Malawi, ICC-02/05-01/09-
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7
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EX.CL/639(XVIII)‟, 30-31 January 2011, Assembly/AU/Dec.334(XVI), para 5; 
African Union, Assembly, „Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly 
Decisions on the International Criminal Court – Doc. EX.CL/670(XIX)‟, 30 June-1 
July 2011, Assembly/AU/Dec.366(XVII) (30 June-1 July 2011 AU Decision, para 10; 
30 June-1 July 2011 AU Decision, para 5. 
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requests. The Chamber asserted that immunity for Heads of State in 
prosecutions by international tribunals and courts had been rejected over and 
over again since the days of World War I, citing numerous authorities in 
support of the conclusion that such immunity no longer existed where an 
international court issued an arrest warrant for international crimes, including 
the ICJ decision in Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium (the Arrest 
Warrant case)
8
 and the ruling of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals 
Chamber in Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor.
9
 The Chamber also sought 
support from Cassese, admitting that personal immunity before national 
courts may prevail since national authorities may use prosecutions to further 
their own interest and limit a foreign state‟s “ability to engage in international 
action”.10 However, such a danger did not exist in the case of prosecutions by 
international courts and tribunals (emphasis added), which were “totally 
independent of states and subject to strict rules of impartiality.”11  
The Chamber concluded that on the basis of these authorities it was now 
“a principle in international law that immunity of either former or serving 
Heads of State cannot be invoked to oppose a prosecution by an international 
court”12 whether or not the States were party to the Rome Statute. The 
Chamber added that the exercise of jurisdiction of the ICC in this case 
followed from a referral by the UNSC under its Chapter VII powers. 
The Chamber admitted that there existed “an inherent tension”13 between 
Articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute where the Court had issued a 
Request for Arrest and Surrender of a Head of State. Nonetheless, Malawi and 
the African Union could not rely on Article 98(1) to justify non-cooperation. 
The authorities clearly established that the immunity of a Head of State 
vanishes in the face of prosecution by an international tribunal or court. 
Whilst the prosecution of only one current Head of State had been initiated at 
the time of the “Arrest Warrant Case” judgment (in the case of Charles 
Taylor), since then proceedings had begun against Slobodan Milosevic, 
Muammar Gaddafi, Laurent Gbagbo, and now Omar Al Bashir. Evidently, 
international prosecutions against Heads of State could now be seen as 
accepted practice. Furthermore, the ratification of the Rome Statute and in 
particular Article 27(2) by 121 States Parties supported the argument that 
international practice stripped immunity from top officials under national and 
                                                     
8
 Judgment, 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 2002. 
9
 Case Number SCSL-2003-1-AR72(E), Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 31 
May 2004, paras 51-52. 
10
 A Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2008), 
312. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 ICC-02/05-01/09-139, at para 36. 
13
 Ibid, at para 37. 
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international law in the face of prosecutions by the International Criminal 
Court. For Malawi to ratify the Rome Statute, and then refuse to surrender Al 
Bashir, who was sought to be prosecuted for inciting genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, was at the very least inconsistent and “contrary 
to the purpose of the Statute Malawi ha[d] ratified”.14  
The Chamber therefore concluded that customary international law of 
immunities no longer applied when an international court requested the arrest 
and surrender of a Head of State wanted for international crimes and that 
Article 98(1), in this instance, did not apply. The Chamber ordered the 
Registrar to transmit the present decision to the UNSC and to the Assembly of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute. 
 
4. COMMENTARY 
 
Some critics have argued that the logic applied by the Chamber in this 
decision is at least partially flawed, although the result is to be welcomed. 
Akande, for instance, states that the effect of the decision is not only to render 
customary international law of immunities applying to current Heads of State 
obsolete, but also Article 98 of the Rome Statute itself.
15
 More importantly, 
the reasoning of the Chamber ignores the fact that the Rome Statute is a treaty 
instrument, binding on only the signatories.
16
 Akande asserts that criminal 
liability of a non-State party does not arise simply from the international 
nature of the court or tribunal seeking the arrest of the Head of State of a non-
party. It could be deemed to arise, however, where the UNSC refers the matter 
to the ICC for investigation and prosecution. On becoming a member of the 
United Nations, Sudan, the country in question, has entrusted the Security 
Council with the power to take any action it deems fit (under the powers 
conferred by Chapter VII of the Charter) to maintain international peace and 
security, including the referral of the situation to an international tribunal or 
court. 
According to Akande a state is under an obligation to consider whether an 
official‟s immunity prevents the host state from cooperating with the ICC‟s 
request to surrender or arrest that official.
17
 Having examined the apparent 
conflict between Article 98(1) and (2), and Article 27 of the Rome Statute he 
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 Ibid, at para 41.  
15
 D Akande, „ICC Issues Detailed Decision on Bashir‟s Immunity (. . . At long Last . 
. . ) But Gets the Law Wrong‟ EJIL: Talk, 15 December 2011: available at:  
http://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-issues-detailed-decision-on-bashir‟s-immunity-at-long-
last-but-gets-the-law-wrong/ (accessed 1 July 2013). 
16
 See Article 34 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
17
 Dapo Akande „International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court‟ 
(2004) 98 Am J Int‟l L 396, 409, 420. 
CASE COMMENTARY 
202 
concludes that the immunity of non-state parties remains unaffected since they 
are not signatories to the treaty.
18
 Even more significantly, he argues that 
Article 98 has the effect of relieving a host state from its responsibility to 
surrender a suspect, where international law obligations provide for immunity 
of a non-state party.
19
 This is the same position taken by the African Union in 
the case of President Al Bashir. 
The stance of Akande and the African Union appears to be in direct 
conflict with that of the Pre-Trial Chamber which relies heavily on the ICJ‟s 
opinio juris in the Arrest Warrant case and even extends it. The Arrest 
Warrant case established that the personal immunity of foreign officials 
remained intact before national courts. However, the majority of judges 
proposed obiter dicta that immunity may not exist before international 
criminal courts or tribunals, where such courts have jurisdiction,
20
 and this 
suggestion was unquestioningly accepted by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the 
ICC. The Pre-Trial Chamber also relies on the view of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL), which held that “the principle seems now established 
that the sovereign equality of states does not prevent a Head of State from 
being prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal or court”,21 having 
considered the Statutes of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military 
Tribunals, the ad hoc international criminal courts as well as the permanent 
ICC, and the Arrest Warrant and Pinochet
22
 cases.  
However, it is submitted that the Pre-Trial Chamber, in relying on these 
authorities as establishing a general principle, fails to consider the matter of 
jurisdiction. As Akande points out, whether an official is permitted to rely on 
international law immunities “to avoid prosecutions by international tribunals 
depends on the nature of the tribunal: how it was established and whether the 
State of the official sought to be tried is bound by the instrument establishing 
the tribunal.”23 For instance, the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) were established through 
Security Council Resolutions
24
 under Chapter VII powers, and the provisions 
in the Statutes establishing those tribunals are therefore binding on all UN 
members, including those that remove the immunity of Heads of State. Treaty 
                                                     
18
 Ibid p 421. 
19 
Ibid p 424. 
20
 Above para 61. Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal delivered a Joint 
Separate Opinion, para 79. 
21
 Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, supra, footnote 18, para 52. 
22
 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) 
[2000] 1 AC 147; [1999] 2 WLR 827 HL. 
23
 Above p 417. 
24
 UNSCR 827 of 25
th
 May established the ICTY, and UNSCR 955 of 8
th
 November 
1994 established the ICTR. 
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provisions establishing an international court or tribunal, however, are by 
virtue of Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
25
 only 
binding on the parties to that treaty and are therefore incapable of removing 
international law immunities of non-party states. The Pre-Trial Chamber 
therefore erroneously relies on the mere fact of its status as an international 
tribunal trying international crimes as a sufficient reason to remove the 
immunity of non-state parties. Akande sums up the situations in which 
international immunities may be ignored before international courts or 
tribunals as “(1) ... the instruments creating those tribunals expressly or 
implicitly remove the relevant immunity, and (2) ... the state of the official 
concerned is bound by the instrument removing the immunity.”26 
Malawi‟s written representations with regard to its action (or rather non-
action), referred to by the Chamber in its decision, highlight the apparent 
conflict between Articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute. Article 27(1) 
provides for criminal responsibility regardless of „official capacity as a Head 
of State or Government‟, and Article 27(2) provides that „immunities … shall 
not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.‟ By 
contrast, Article 98(1) seemingly preserves customary international law 
immunity. In fact, it obliges the Court not to: 
 
proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require 
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international law … unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation 
of that third State for the waiver of the immunity. 
 
This apparent conflict can be explained and overcome if one looks at who 
the provisions refer to. Article 27(2) presents an unprecedented waiver of 
immunity of officials before the ICC. There is no corresponding provision in 
the instruments setting up the IMTs at Nuremberg and Tokyo or the ICTY and 
ICTR. However, this voluntary waiver of immunity before the ICC only 
                                                     
25
 Ibid. The general rule in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention, also known by the 
maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt undoubtedly reflects customary 
international law: see David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 7
th
 ed, 
Sweet and Maxwell p 686. However, Article 38 provides that “Nothing … precludes a 
rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule 
of international law, recognised as such.” This allows room for development, and the 
possibility that a treaty may in the future apply to non-signatories erga omnes, if it 
were to be recognised as customary international law established by opinio juris and 
state practice. It remains to be seen how likely such erga omnes application of the 
Rome Statute would be, especially in the face of strong resistance by 3 of the P5 
members of the UN Security Council, the African Union, and other influential 
countries. 
26
 Ibid, p 418. 
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applies to states parties of the Rome Statute, who as signatories have chosen 
to surrender their right to immunity. Non-party States have not signed up to 
the provisions of the Rome Statute, nor have they ratified it, and their position 
therefore remains untouched. At no point in time have non-signatories 
surrendered their right to immunity under customary international law. Article 
98 can in fact be seen as supporting the position of non-party States by 
respecting customary international law obligations and the rights of parties not 
subject to the provisions of the Rome Statute. Articles 27 and 98 therefore 
represent no conflict at all, they simply apply to different groups. 
As undesirable as it may seem in the pursuit of justice, this deliberate 
preservation by the authors of the Rome Statute of customary international 
law immunities of non-party states cannot be overlooked. The desperate 
attempt by the Pre-Trial Chamber to rectify this situation and ignore Article 
98 gives no credit to the ICC. Alternatively, the Chamber should have chosen 
the less controversial approach to base the authority to remove Al Bashir‟s 
immunity simply on the fact that the Security Council referred the situation in 
Darfur to the ICC. It is argued that this referral implies the power to seek 
arrest and prosecution of Al Bashir, and to that end the customary 
international law immunity of a non-party state was suspended by virtue of 
the Security Council Resolution. Approaching the matter from this angle, 
there would be no debate as to the jurisdiction of the court over a non-party 
state. 
Any real criticism of Malawi‟s failure to comply with the request to arrest 
and surrender Al Bashir should have focused on their obligation to have 
brought their concerns with regard to the Court‟s request to its attention 
immediately, in accordance with Article 97. Equally Rule 195 of the ICC‟s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence obliged Malawi to „provide any information 
relevant to assist the Court in the application of Article 98‟, and clearly 
Malawi failed in this obligation. 
Akande suggests an alternative argument in order to establish jurisdiction 
of the Court, and justify stripping Al Bashir of immunity.
27
 He points out that 
UNSC Resolution 1593 imposes an obligation on the Government of Sudan to 
“cooperate fully” with the ICC. This could be interpreted as suggesting that 
Sudan itself is to be considered analogous to a state party and therefore bound 
by the Rome Statute and the application of Article 27, thus removing 
immunity from Al Bashir.  
Other non-members of the ICC, whilst urged by UNSC Resolution 1593 
to cooperate with the ICC, have no obligation under the Rome Statute, as is 
explicitly observed in the SCR. Unlike with the ad hoc tribunals, no explicit 
                                                     
27
 D Akande, „Who is obliged to arrest Bashir?‟ EJIL: Talk, 13 March, 2009: 
available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/who-is-obliged-to-arrest-bashir?/ (accessed 1 July 
2013). 
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obligation to cooperate with the tribunals has been imposed on non-member 
states. Akande suggests that there could be a permission to act and arrest 
Bashir instead of an obligation, because his immunity could be seen to have 
been removed by the resolution. Non-member States could be deemed to be 
relieved from an international law duty to observe Al Bashir‟s immunity if 
they so choose, whereas member states could be perceived to be under an 
actual obligation to ignore Al Bashir‟s immunity.  
The Chamber‟s condemnation of Malawi should have been based on this 
obligation of a member state, arising from UNSC Resolution 1593, to 
cooperate with the ICC. The blanket assertion that jurisdiction arises 
automatically due to the international nature of the ICC is legally questionable 
as well as unnecessary. The Chamber would have been better advised to rely 
solely on UNSC Resolution 1593, subjecting Sudan to the jurisdiction of the 
Court, and by implication also subjecting it to the Rome Statute and therefore 
Article 27. Effectively, Al Bashir‟s immunity is not just removed before the 
Court but also before other nations acting in support of the court. 
The Chamber‟s decision can be criticised on other, albeit less imaginative 
grounds. Gaeta asserts that whilst the rules of customary international law on 
immunities do not apply to an international tribunal or court (even where a 
state is not a member of a treaty-based court), these customary rules cannot be 
disregarded by a state itself.
28
 Therefore, whilst the arrest warrant by the ICC 
following UNSC Resolution 1593 was lawful, the request to states parties to 
arrest and surrender President Al Bashir was not, and is contrary to Article 
98(1) and therefore an ultra vires act.
29
 Gaeta relies on the ICJ‟s opinion in 
the Arrest Warrant case, referring expressly to Article 27(2) of the Rome 
Statute that “immunities… which may attach to the official capacity of a 
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person”. She does, however, point 
out that the ICJ at no stage considered if states had any duty or right to 
disregard customary international law on immunities in order to comply with 
a request for cooperation by an international tribunal or court.
30
 The unhelpful 
fact that the ICC does not have any enforcement powers in its own right does 
not relieve states from their duty to respect immunities, simply in order to 
comply with a request by the ICC. In the Bashir case, Gaeta raises the 
unlikely possibility that the ICC could have got around this problem by 
seeking a waiver of Bashir‟s immunity from Sudan. Should such a waiver of 
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 P Gaeta, „Does President Al Bashir enjoy immunity from arrest?‟ [2009] Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 315. 
29
 Ibid, p 8. 
30
 Ibid. 
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immunity have been granted, the court‟s request for cooperation and arrest 
would have been lawful.
31
 
Whilst Gaeta‟s consideration of states‟ obligations adds an interesting 
dimension to the discussion, even the very starting point of her argument has 
to be considered with caution. Gaeta accepts unquestioningly that, by virtue of 
the ICJ‟s opinion, Article 27 applies even to non-signatories of the Rome 
Treaty, and the immunity of officials is, as a matter of principle, removed 
before international courts. In her words: 
 
“[i]nternational criminal courts are not organs of a particular state; 
they act on behalf of the international community as a whole to protect 
collective or even universal values, and thus to repress very serious 
international crimes.”32  
 
This is an expression of laudable intentions, with which she credits the 
ICC. However it cannot be overlooked that the ICC is a membership-based 
court, and Gaeta‟s blanket acceptance of the removal of immunities before the 
court is by no means a settled argument. Simply but persuasively put, “[i]f 
neither State A nor State B has the power to ignore the personal immunity of 
State C without consent, then the two together cannot create an international 
court and bestow upon it a power that they do not possess. The problem 
remains whether it is two States, or twenty, or sixty: they cannot bestow a 
power that they do not possess.”33 It is submitted, therefore, that the argument 
promoted by Akande, that jurisdiction is triggered and immunity is removed 
through the Security Council Resolution, is a much safer one. This point is 
also lent support by Jacobs,
34
 who similarly to Akande fails to accept as 
inevitable the conclusion that the Arrest Warrant case establishes the abolition 
of immunity of Heads of State before an international tribunal. As Jacobs 
points out, the effect of the Chamber‟s blanket assertion that immunity no 
longer applies before an international criminal court would be that other 
leaders like Obama, Medvedev, and Hu could be prosecuted at any time for 
international crimes by the ICC. Such impunity may be morally desirable, and 
certainly was the intention of the authors of the Rome Statute. Sadly it is, 
however, not universally accepted, given the existing power structure of the 
Security Council, the continuing resistance by three of the P5 members 
                                                     
31
 Ibid, p 6. 
32
 Ibid, p 4 
33
 R Cryer, H Friman, D Robinson, E. Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International 
Criminal Law and Procedure, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press 2010) 551. 
34
 D Jacobs, „Obama, Medvedev and Hu Jintao may be prosecuted by International 
Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber concludes‟ 15th December 2011: available at 
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com. 
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towards the ICC, and the very nature of this treaty-based court requiring 
voluntary membership and ratification of its Statute.  
Jacobs‟ point goes to the very core of this characteristic of the ICC, by 
emphasising that it is a court established by consent, and non-parties can only 
be subjected to its jurisdiction by condemnation of the international 
community as a whole via a Security Council referral utilizing its Chapter VII 
powers. Significantly, three of the five permanent members have refused to 
sign up to the Rome Statute, and the use of their veto powers has in past 
situations thwarted a condemnation by Security Council referral. The ICC 
now sadly has an ill-fated reputation of being a court for Africa, and 
potentially the Middle East rather than a truly international one. This highly 
sceptical view taken particularly by the African Union,
35
 cannot altogether be 
shaken off.  
Additionally, it highlights the potential paralysis and impotence of the 
Court, unless it has jurisdiction through membership or a Security Council 
referral. Viewed from this angle, it is understandable, albeit legally 
questionable, that the Chamber sought to extend its own jurisdiction as a 
matter of principle, particularly in light of its established purpose of ending 
impunity for the perpetrators of the worst international crimes. There may, 
however, be a way out of this impasse. In his 2005 report on Darfur, Cassese 
suggests that rulings by international criminal courts and tribunals, if 
uncontested by States, may become customary international law (emphasis 
added), a point demonstrated by the fact that some renowned academics like 
Gaeta have already (at least partly) accepted the ICC‟s rulings including its 
interpretation of the ICJ opinion in the Arrest Warrant case, as new customary 
international law with the effect that it may indeed serve to remove the 
immunity of heads of state before an international tribunal. As the judges 
pointed out in the Arrest Warrant case, “the law… is in constant evolution, 
with a discernible trend to limiting immunity and strengthening 
accountability.”36 If state practice and opinio juris keep reinforcing the view 
that personal immunity is no barrier before an international court, this may 
emerge as customary international law. 
                                                     
35
 As reinforced by the decisions of the AU Assembly at its 19th summit. The AU 
endorsed the request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the question of 
immunities of Heads of States not party to the Rome Statute, effectively seeking a 
decision by the ICJ that is different from that reached by the Pre-Trial Chamber. The 
AU Assembly also asked its members to consider concluding bilateral agreements on 
the immunities of their officials, in an attempt to take advantage of Article 98 (2) of 
the Rome Statute. These developments have been discussed in more detail in Dapo 
Akande‟s blog at http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-african-union-the-icc-and-universal-
jurisdiction-some-recent-developments posted on 29th August 2012. 
36
 Arrest Warrant case, above, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans 
and Buergenthal, para 75. 
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As it stands, however, the Chamber‟s decision is undoubtedly flawed. The 
somewhat desperate attempt to establish jurisdiction and lack of immunity 
highlights the precise difficulties the Court faces. Its legitimacy is dependent 
on either acceptance by its signatories (which regrettably are currently less 
than two thirds of the world‟s States and does not include three of the 
permanent members of the Security Council, i.e. Russia, China, and the 
United States), or on a Security Council Referral, which exists in the case of 
Darfur, but would be unlikely to occur in a situation involving said P5 
members or indeed their allies. An example of such a situation is the current 
inactivity (recently condemned by the General Assembly) of the Security 
Council in the situation of Syria, which has historically enjoyed strong ties 
with the P5 member Russia. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
What then is the solution in this ongoing quest to bring to justice 
international criminals who are traditionally immune from prosecution? Let us 
for a brief moment indulge the more impatient of us, who would rather not 
have to wait for the slow change in the customary international law of 
immunities, or the voluntary signing up of the rest of the world, in their own 
time, to the Rome Statute. Let us instead imagine it was within our power to 
shake up the system and create universal jurisdiction over such criminals. One 
could begin by attempting to assert sufficient political and diplomatic pressure 
on non-signatories to make them feel ostracised by the international 
community unless they become members of the ICC. As this may not be 
entirely successful and the jurisdiction of the ICC would still largely depend 
on Security Council Referrals, a shake-up of power distribution in the 
Security Council appears to be a fundamental requirement. Veto powers based 
on the post-WWII reality should be abandoned, and a fairer, perhaps rotating 
system should be introduced, and the Charter amended to reflect these 
changes. Once that has been achieved, the option to adopt the ICC as an 
instrument of the United Nations, rather than some willing signatories, should 
be put to the General Assembly, and a universally applicable justice system 
with its own permanent international criminal court would be the result. At 
last, the currently short arm of the international criminal justice system may 
be long enough to reach the worst perpetrators of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, without exception, and impunity would no longer exist. 
Unfortunately, it may be necessary to come back down to earth, in which 
case the only option is to remain positive that developing customary 
international law is indeed slowly eroding the immunity of Heads of State, 
leading to greater accountability for the commission of international crimes. 
 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
209 
6. APPENDIX 
 
Article 27 
 
Irrelevance of official capacity 
 
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as 
a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or 
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in 
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this 
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction 
of sentence.   
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the 
official capacity of a person, whether under national or international 
law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a 
person. 
 
7. ARTICLE 98 
 
Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to 
surrender 
 
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or 
assistance which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect 
to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third 
State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third 
State for the waiver of the immunity. 
 
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which 
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the 
consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that 
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of 
the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender. 
